Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Fred Sommers and George Engelbretsen

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27 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18901 Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
18915 If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen]
18919 There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
18913 Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
18895 Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
18907 Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
18912 Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
18897 Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18922 Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen]
18893 Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
18905 Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18903 Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
18908 Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
18894 Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
6007 If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6006 If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
6008 Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18917 Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18900 Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18916 Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13127 Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
18921 Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18898 In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
19. Language / B. Reference / 2. Denoting
18918 Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
18920 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
18906 Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen]